“Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 returned safely to @flyPDX around 5 p.m. local time on Friday, Jan. 5, after the crew reported a pressurization issue. The aircraft was traveling to @flyONT in California. The FAA and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) will investigate.”

“At Alaska Airlines, safety is our foundational value and the most important thing we focus on every day. Following tonight’s event on Flight 1282, we have decided to take the precautionary step of temporarily grounding our fleet of 65 Boeing 737-9 aircraft. Each aircraft will be returned to service only after completion of full maintenance and safety inspections. We anticipate all inspections will be completed in the next few days.”

“As of this morning, inspections on more than a quarter of our 737-9 fleet are complete with no concerning findings. Aircraft will return to service as their inspections are completed with our full confidence.”

“The FAA will order the temporary grounding of certain Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft operated by U.S. airlines or in U.S. territory.

The Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) that will be issued shortly will require operators to inspect aircraft before further flight that do not meet the inspection cycles specified in the EAD. The required inspections will take around four to eight hours per aircraft.

The EAD will affect approximately 171 airplanes worldwide.”

“Safety is our top priority and we deeply regret the impact this event has had on our customers and their passengers. We agree with and fully support the FAA’s decision to require immediate inspections of 737-9 airplanes with the same configuration as the affected airplane. In addition, a Boeing technical team is supporting the NTSB’s investigation into the Jan. 5 accident. We will remain in close contact with our regulator and customers.”

“

Early this morning, our maintenance team began a detailed inspection process in connection with our decision to temporarily ground our fleet of Boeing 737-9 aircraft. Of the 65 737-9 aircraft in our fleet, it was determined that 18 had in-depth and thorough plug door inspections performed as part of a recent heavy maintenance visit. These 18 aircraft were cleared to return to service today.  

The inspection process of the remaining 737-9 aircraft is expected to be completed in the next few days. We will provide additional updates on the progress of our inspections.” 

“Today, the FAA issued an emergency airworthiness directive (EAD), requiring all operators of the 737-9 MAX aircraft to conduct specific inspections before returning the aircraft to service.  We are working with the FAA to ensure that our inspections meet their detailed requirements and comply with the EAD, but this process will take more time.  

Eighteen of Alaska’s 737-9 MAX aircraft received in-depth inspections as part of heavy maintenance checks and continued in service today until we received the FAA’s EAD. These aircraft have now also been pulled from service until details about possible additional maintenance work are confirmed with the FAA. We are in touch with the FAA to determine what, if any, further work is required before these aircraft are returned to service.”

“United has temporarily suspended service on all Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft to conduct inspections required by the FAA. We are working with the FAA to clarify the inspection process and the requirements for returning all MAX 9 aircraft to service.”

“The FAA has approved a method to comply with the FAA’s Boeing 737-9 emergency airworthiness directive and it has been provided to the affected operators.”

“Boeing on Monday issued a message to operators with instructions for inspecting certain 737-9 airplanes.

In a message to employees, Boeing Commercial Airplanes President and CEO Stan Deal said teams have been working diligently — with thorough FAA review — to provide comprehensive, technical instructions to operators for the required inspections.

“We agree with and fully support the FAA’s decision to require immediate inspections of 737-9 MAX airplanes with the same configuration as the affected airplane. The assembly to be inspected is not found on other members of the 737 MAX family.

Our teams have been working diligently — with thorough FAA review — to provide comprehensive, technical instructions to operators for the required inspections. This morning, our team issued the instructions via a multi-operator message. We are working closely with 737-9 MAX customers and providing the technical assistance they may need, while staying in contact with the FAA as we move forward.”

“This morning, Boeing issued a multi-operator message (MOM) which provided inspection details for the 737-9 MAX aircraft, which have been approved by the FAA. Two additional steps must occur before inspections can begin:

FAA must approve operators’ inspection processes to ensure compliance (called an Alternate Method of Compliance, or AMOC);Alaska must develop detailed inspection instructions and processes for our maintenance technicians to follow.

As we await further information from the FAA and work through these important steps, our technicians have prepared each aircraft to be immediately ready for the required inspection when instructions are finalized.”

“Since we began preliminary inspections on Saturday, we have found instances that appear to relate to installation issues in the door plug – for example, bolts that needed additional tightening. These findings will be remedied by our Tech Ops team to safely return the aircraft to service.

Additional background:

We are still awaiting final approval from the FAA on the full inspection processUnited has 79 Boeing 737 MAX 9 aircraft.

 

About the inspection process:

Beginning on Saturday, United began preparing for these inspections by removing the inner panel to access the door plug and visually inspecting the area while awaiting final instructions. To access each door plug, we remove two rows of seats and the sidewall liner. This has already been done on most Max 9s.We will inspect and verify proper installation of the door and frame hardware.We’ll open the door and inspect the area around the door and seal. We’ll then resecure the door, ensuring proper fit and security.We’ll document and correct any discrepancies before returning that aircraft to service.Each inspection will include a team of five United technicians working for several hours on each aircraft. We’ll learn more about the exact amount of time each inspection requires as we do more of them.”

“We continue to wait for final documentation from Boeing and the FAA before we can begin the formal inspection process.  

As our maintenance technicians began preparing our 737-9 MAX fleet for inspections, they accessed the area in question. Initial reports from our technicians indicate some loose hardware was visible on some aircraft.  

When we are able to proceed with the formal inspection process, all aircraft will be thoroughly inspected in accordance with detailed instructions provided by the FAA in consultation with Boeing. Any findings will be fully addressed in a matter that satisfies our safety standards and FAA compliance. The formal inspections will also require documenting all findings and those will be reported to the FAA. No aircraft will be returned to service until all of these steps are complete. The safety of these aircraft is our priority and we will take the time and steps necessary to ensure their airworthiness, in close partnership with the FAA.”

“Every Boeing 737-9 Max with a plug door will remain grounded until the FAA finds each can safely return to operation. To begin this process, Boeing must provide instructions to operators for inspections and maintenance. Boeing offered an initial version of instructions yesterday which they are now revising because of feedback received in response. Upon receiving the revised version of instructions from Boeing the FAA will conduct a thorough review.”

“This incident should have never happened and it cannot happen again. FAA formally notified Boeing that it is conducting an investigation to determine if Boeing failed to ensure completed products conformed to its approved design and were in a condition for safe operation in compliance with FAA regulations. This investigation is a result of an incident on a Boeing Model 737-9 MAX where it lost a ‘plug’ type passenger door and additional discrepancies. Boeing’s manufacturing practices need to comply with the high safety standards they’re legally accountable to meet.

‘The above-described circumstances indicate that Boeing may have failed to ensure its completed products conformed to its approved design and were in a condition for safe operation in accordance with quality system inspection and test procedures.’”

Read the full text of the letter from the FAA to Boeing.

“‘We will cooperate fully and transparently with the FAA and the NTSB on their investigations.’

Boeing President and CEO Dave Calhoun addressed the importance of trust and transparency at a recent all-employee safety meeting on Jan. 9, 2024. Here are two excerpts:

On transparency: ‘We’re going to approach it with 100% complete transparency every step of the way.’On trust: ‘We’re going to have to demonstrate it by our actions, by our willingness to work directly and transparently with them (customers). And to make sure they understand that every airplane that Boeing has its name on that’s in the sky is in fact safe.’”

“After taking decisive and immediate action to ground approximately 171 Boeing 737-9 MAX planes, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) today announced new and significant actions to immediately increase its oversight of Boeing production and manufacturing. These actions come one day after the FAA formally notified Boeing that the FAA has launched an investigation into the company as a result of last Friday’s incident on a Boeing Model 737-9 MAX in which the aircraft lost a passenger door plug while in flight. 

The actions announced today include the FAA conducting:

An audit involving the Boeing 737-9 MAX production line and its suppliers to evaluate Boeing’s compliance with its approved quality procedures. The results of the FAA’s audit analysis will determine whether additional audits are necessary.Increased monitoring of Boeing 737-9 MAX in-service events.Assessment of safety risks around delegated authority and quality oversight, and examination of options to move these functions under independent, third-party entities.

‘It is time to re-examine the delegation of authority and assess any associated safety risks,” FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker said. ‘The grounding of the 737-9 and the multiple production-related issues identified in recent years require us to look at every option to reduce risk. The FAA is exploring the use of an independent third party to oversee Boeing’s inspections and its quality system.’”

“The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is requiring Boeing to provide additional data before the agency approves an extensive and rigorous inspection and maintenance process for returning 737 MAX-9 aircraft to service.

‘We are working to make sure nothing like this happens again,’ FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker said. ‘Our only concern is the safety of American travelers and the Boeing 737-9 MAX will not return to the skies until we are entirely satisfied it is safe.’

After reviewing Boeing’s proposed inspection and maintenance instructions, the FAA determined it needed additional data before approving them. Accordingly, the FAA is requiring plug-door inspections of 40 aircraft. 

The FAA is encouraged by the exhaustive nature of Boeing’s instructions for inspections and maintenance. However, in the interest of maintaining the highest standard of safety the agency will not approve the inspection and maintenance process until it reviews data from the initial round of 40 inspections. 

Upon a full review of the data the FAA will make a determination whether the instructions satisfy compliance with the highest standard of safety. If the FAA approves Boeing’s inspection and maintenance instructions, operators will be required to perform that regimen on every aircraft before it is returned to service.”

“Today, the FAA communicated its instructions for preliminary inspections of some of our 737-9 MAX aircraft.  

 

Data collected from these inspections will inform the FAA’s ultimate issuance of a global Method of Compliance (MOC) and the process to complete inspections of the full fleet – a required step to safely return the aircraft to service.”

“Alaska Airlines began preliminary inspections this weekend on a group of our 737-9 MAX aircraft.  

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is requiring more data from Boeing before approving the manufacturer’s proposed inspection and maintenance instructions that will be used to conduct final inspections on all 737-9 MAX and safely return the planes to service. Up to 20 of our planes could undergo preliminary inspections. 

Moving forward 

Aviation safety is based on having multiple levels of quality control and safety assurance, much like system redundancies that are built into an aircraft for operational safety. Together, these layers have made the U.S. aviation industry the safest in the world. 

Last week’s incident involving Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 was an extremely sobering reminder that these layers require continuous strengthening and improvement. 

Boeing leadership has publicly said that this incident is the result of a “quality escape.” This week, we engaged in a candid conversation with Boeing’s CEO and leadership team to discuss their quality improvement plans to ensure the delivery of the highest quality aircraft off the production line for Alaska. 

We welcome and appreciate the FAA’s recently announced steps to audit and review all safety processes in the production of the 737-9 MAX aircraft, and more broadly at Boeing and Spirit AeroSystems, Boeing’s supplier that builds the fuselage for the planes. 

In addition to the FAA’s review and oversight, Alaska Airlines will initiate and enhance our own layers of quality control to the production of our airplanes:  

Our quality and audit team began a thorough review of Boeing’s production quality and control systems, including Boeing’s production vendor oversight, and will partner with our maintenance team on the design of enhanced processes for our own quality control over aircraft at Boeing.  Starting this week, we will also enhance our own quality oversight of Alaska aircraft on the Boeing production line, expanding our team with additional experienced professionals to validate work and quality on the Boeing 737 production line.  

Over many decades, we have cultivated a strong partnership with Boeing. With a commitment to transparency and candor, we are dedicated to working together to uphold the utmost quality and safety of our airplanes for our employees and guests.” 

“In a message to employees, Boeing Commercial Airplanes President and CEO Stan Deal announced immediate actions the company is taking to bolster quality assurance and controls in 737 production.

‘As we continue to respond to the Alaska Airlines Flight 1282 accident, our team has been working with the five affected airlines to inspect their 737-9 fleet. They have been examining and collecting measurements around the mid-exit door plugs to ensure they are installed per specifications.

While we complete these tasks to earn Federal Aviation Administration approval to unground the affected 737-9s, our team is also taking a hard look at our quality practices in our factories and across our production system.

We have taken important steps in recent years to strengthen our Quality Management System’s (QMS) foundation and its layers of protection. But, the AS1282 accident and recent customer findings make clear that we are not where we need to be. To that end, we are taking immediate actions to bolster quality assurance and controls across our factories.

More quality inspections: We are planning additional inspections throughout the build process at Boeing and at Spirit. These checks will provide one more layer of scrutiny on top of the thousands of inspections performed today across each 737 airplane, and build on the reviews we have implemented to catch potential non-conformances. Since 2019, we have increased the number of Commercial Airplanes quality inspectors by 20% and we plan to make more investments in the Quality function.Team sessions on quality: We are planning additional sessions for our teams to gather and refocus on the fundamentals of our QMS, take advantage of our expanded training programs, and recommit to improving quality and compliance.Boeing review of Spirit work: We have deployed a team to work alongside Spirit AeroSystems to complement the existing teammates on the ground. Our team is now inspecting Spirit’s installation of the mid-exit door plug and approving them before the fuselage section can be shipped to Boeing. We are also inspecting more than 50 other points in Spirit’s build process and assessing their build plans against engineering specifications.Airline oversight inspections: We are opening our factories to 737 operators for additional oversight inspections to review our production and quality procedures. Spirit will do the same and we will learn from our customers’ insights and findings.Independent assessment: An outside party will be brought in to thoroughly review the Quality Management System at Commercial Airplanes and suggest further improvements.

And as we prepare new 737-9s for delivery, we will conduct the same thorough inspections of the mid-exit door plugs as mandated by the FAA. Customer representatives will continue to have access to anything they want to see onboard their airplane before delivery.

These actions are separate from the FAA’s investigation and the agency’s plan to increase oversight of 737-9 production. We will cooperate fully and transparently with both as we work to restore trust with our regulator and our customers. And as the National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation proceeds, we will take additional steps to improve our practices as the facts and findings dictate.

Everything we do must conform to the requirements in our QMS. Anything less is unacceptable. It is through this standard that we must operate to provide our customers and their passengers complete confidence in Boeing airplanes. Let each one of us take personal accountability and recommit ourselves to this important work.’”

“Admiral Kirkland Donald to lead in-depth assessment of Boeing commercial quality management system.

Admiral Donald and a team of outside experts will conduct a thorough assessment of Boeing’s quality management system for commercial airplanes, including quality programs and practices in Boeing manufacturing facilities and its oversight of commercial supplier quality. His recommendations will be provided to Calhoun and to the Aerospace Safety Committee of Boeing’s Board of Directors.”

“After taking decisive action to ground 171 Boeing 737-9 MAX airplanes, the FAA is now investigating Boeing’s manufacturing practices and production lines, including those involving subcontractor Spirit AeroSystems, bolstering its oversight of Boeing, and examining potential system change. 

On Friday, the FAA announced requirements for a rigorous inspection and maintenance process as a new and necessary step before the FAA contemplates any further steps in the process to return Boeing 737-9 MAXs to service. The first 40 inspections that are part of that process are now complete, and the FAA will thoroughly review the data from them. All 737-9 MAX aircraft with door plugs will remain grounded pending the FAA’s review and final approval of an inspection and maintenance process that satisfies all FAA safety requirements. Once the FAA approves an inspection and maintenance process, it will be required on every grounded 737-9 MAX prior to future operation. The safety of the flying public, not speed, will determine the timeline for returning these aircraft to service.   

The FAA is supporting the National Transportation Safety Board’s investigation into Alaska Airlines Flight 1282. The NTSB is in charge of the investigation and will provide any updates.”  

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA–2024–0032; Project Identifier AD–2024–00021–T; Amendment 39–22663; AD 2024–02–51]

RIN 2120–AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY:

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION:

Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY:

The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737–9 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of an in-flight departure of a mid cabin door plug, which resulted in a rapid decompression of the airplane. This AD prohibits further flight of affected airplanes, until the airplane is inspected and all applicable corrective actions have been performed. The FAA previously sent an emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES:

This AD is effective on January 18, 2024. Emergency AD 2024–02–51, issued on January 6, 2024, which contained the requirements of this amendment, was effective with actual notice.

The FAA must receive comments on this AD by March 4, 2024.

ADDRESSES:

You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to regulations.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

• Fax: 202–493–2251.

• Mail: U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M–30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

• Hand Delivery: Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA–2024–0032; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments received, and other information. The street address for Docket Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael Linegang, Manager, Operational Safety Branch, FAA; phone: 817–222–5390; email: OperationalSafety@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

The FAA invites you to send any written relevant data, views, or arguments about this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under ADDRESSES . Include “Docket No. FAA–2024–0032; Project Identifier AD–2024–00021–T” at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the final rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this final rule because of those comments.

Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to regulations.gov, including any personal information you provide. The agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact received about this final rule.

Confidential Business Information

CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this AD contain commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to this AD, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing CBI as “PROPIN.” The FAA will treat such marked submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public docket of this AD. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Michael Linegang, Manager, Operational Safety Branch, FAA; phone: 817–222–5390; email: OperationalSafety@faa.gov. Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

Background

The FAA issued Emergency AD 2024–02–51, dated January 6, 2024 (Emergency AD 2024–02–51), to address an unsafe condition on certain The Boeing Company Model 737–9 airplanes. The FAA sent the emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. Emergency AD 2024–02–51 prohibits further flight until the airplane is inspected and all applicable corrective actions have been performed.

Emergency AD 2024–02–51 was prompted by a report of an in-flight departure of a mid cabin door plug, which resulted in a rapid decompression of the airplane. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the potential in-flight loss of a mid cabin door plug. This condition, if not addressed, could result in injury to passengers and crew, the door impacting the airplane, and/or loss of control of the airplane.

FAA’s Determination

The FAA is issuing this AD because the agency has determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design.

AD Requirements

This AD prohibits further flight of affected airplanes, until the airplane is inspected and all applicable corrective actions have been performed using a method approved by the Manager, AIR–520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA.

Interim Action

The FAA considers this AD to be an interim action. If final action is later identified, the FAA might consider further rulemaking then.

FAA’s Justification and Determination of the Effective Date

Section 553(b)(3)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 551 et seq.) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency, for “good cause,” finds that those procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Under this section, an agency, upon finding good cause, may issue a final rule without providing notice and seeking comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, upon a finding of good cause.

An unsafe condition exists that required the immediate adoption of Emergency AD 2024–02–51 issued on January 6, 2024, to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. The FAA found that the risk to the flying public justified waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because the in-flight loss of a mid cabin door plug could result in injury to passengers and crew, the door impacting the airplane, and/or loss of control of the airplane. These conditions still exist, and the AD is hereby published in the Federal Register as an amendment to 14 CFR 39.13 to make it effective to all persons. Given the significance of the risk presented by this unsafe condition, it must be immediately addressed. Accordingly, notice and opportunity for prior public comment are impracticable and contrary to the public interest pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(B). In addition, the FAA finds that good cause exists pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days, for the same reasons the FAA found good cause to forgo notice and comment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)

The requirements of the RFA do not apply when an agency finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt a rule without prior notice and comment. Because the FAA has determined that it has good cause to adopt this rule without notice and comment, RFA analysis is not required.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 144 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

The FAA has received no definitive data on which to base the cost estimates for the corrective actions specified in this AD.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, and

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportationAircraftAviation safetyIncorporation by referenceSafety

Adoption of the Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

1.The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

2.The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

2024–02–51 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39–22663; Docket No. FAA–2024–0032; Project Identifier AD–2024–00021–T.

(a) Effective Date

The FAA issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2024–02–51 on January 6, 2024, directly to affected owners and operators. As a result of such actual notice, the emergency AD was effective for those owners and operators on the date it was provided. This AD contains the same requirements as that emergency AD and, for those who did not receive actual notice, is effective on January 18, 2024.

(b) Affected ADs

None.

(c) Applicability

This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737–9 airplanes, certificated in any category, with a mid cabin door plug installed.

(d) Subject

Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 52, Doors.

(e) Unsafe Condition

This AD was prompted by a report of an in-flight departure of a mid cabin door plug, which resulted in a rapid decompression of the airplane. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the potential in-flight loss of a mid cabin door plug, which could result in injury to passengers and crew, the door impacting the airplane, and/or loss of control of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.

(g) Inspection or Other Action

As of the effective date of this AD, further flight is prohibited until the airplane is inspected and all applicable corrective actions have been performed using a method approved by the Manager, AIR–520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA.

(h) Special Flight Permits

Special flight permits, as described in 14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199, are allowed only for unpressurized flights.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

(1) The Manager, AIR–520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the certification office, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (j) of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding district office.

(3) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, AIR–520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, to make those findings. To be approved, the repair method, modification deviation, or alteration deviation must meet the certification basis of the airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.

(j) Related Information

For further information about this AD, contact Michael Linegang, Manager, Operational Safety Branch, FAA; phone: 817–222–5390; email: OperationalSafety@faa.gov.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

None.